その結果、株価と不動産価格が下落し、金融機関は大量の不良債権を抱えることになり、需要が落ち込んでしまったことにより企業収益も一気に低下した。
これがバブル崩壊で、その後、消費税増税もその一因となり、日本社会はデフレ不況に陥ったが、日本経済は悪夢の30年間に突入することになる。
【参考】
非合理な熱狂（Irrational Exuberance） Robert Shiller： During Japan’s bubble era, the Nikkei 225 peaked at 38,915 yen in 1989, and real estate prices soared. Shiller attributes this to a “feedback loop,” where rising prices fueled further expectations of gains, drawing in more investors. In his writings, he connects the subsequent crash—marked by sharp declines in stock and land prices—and the prolonged economic stagnation (the “Lost Decades”) to a sudden cooling of investor sentiment.
流動性の罠（Liquidity Trap） Paul Krugman： After the bubble burst, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) adopted a zero-interest-rate policy in 1999, but businesses and households did not increase borrowing, and investment and consumption remained stagnant. Krugman labels this a “Liquidity Trap,” where expectations of future deflation lead economic agents to hoard cash, trapping the economy in a vicious cycle of stagnation. He sees Japan as a modern demonstration of Keynesian “insufficient effective demand.”
